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1 Introduction
How do networks of professional contacts contribute to the development of an individual’s
career? In particular, do they do so by making the individual more valuable to an employer, or
rather by overcoming information asymmetries and enabling the individual to take advantage of
employment opportunities he or she might otherwise not hear about? In this paper we explore
this question empirically using a sample of executives in US and European firms.
Careers are shaped by a succession of professional opportunities and mobility decisions.
Career developments are often relatively smooth, entailing gradual promotions or changes of
responsibilities and duties within the current firm. However, at several points in time oppor-
tunities may arise that would modify the ex ante direction, like junctions in a road network.
These represent discontinuous jumps in the career trajectory, and each decision whether or not
to change job affects a worker’s future offers.
What characterizes career progression is its dynamic dimension: choices at each switching
point affect subsequent decisions. What’s more, each choice influences the opportunities that
will arise in the future both directly and indirectly. Indeed, not only do the type of offers
potentially available at each point in time depends on one’s current and past jobs, but crucially
the probability of receiving an offer may be also affected by one’s professional previous history
through the characteristics of the network that each worker builds in her professional environ-
ment. In turn, when a worker decides to change job, her network is affected, so that professional
network and career actually coevolve.
Our approach in this paper is to build a dynamic model of career progression and to test
it on an original dataset of nearly 7000 executives and board members in over 3000 firms in 4
countries (US, UK, France, and Germany) between 1997 and 2009.1 The richness of the dataset
allows to account for the dynamic aspects of the relationship between professional networks and
career progression, exploiting the panel dimension of the dataset.
Our econometric analysis focuses on the effects of the professional network on salary. Based
on the benchmark specification suggested by our theoretical framework, we find that profes-
sional networks are relevant both because they are valuable for the employer and because they
1The dataset is based on information provided by BoardEx Ltd.
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facilitate job mobility. These findings are robust to alternative definitions of career value and
specifications accounting for mobility and link endogeneity. Moreover, networks characterized
on average by ties between nodes that have been colleagues for a long time have a lower direct
and indirect effect on labor outcomes, corroborating the well known arguments of Granovet-
ter [1973] about ‘the strength of weak ties’. Finally, the older are the links in an individual’s
network, the less valuable they are to the employer.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 describes
our data and gives a number of descriptive statistics. Section 4 develops a theoretical model
of an individual’s dynamic career choices. Section 5 derives the econometric specification and
presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
The literature on social networks has been growing very rapidly in recent years, both in sociology
and more recently in economics. The boom in network research has been seen as part of a general
shift, beginning in the second half of the 20th century, away from individualist, essentialist and
atomistic explanations toward more relational, contextual and systemic understandings.
Labor market outcomes are among the most carefully studied examples of the importance
of networks in economics. Granovetter [1973]’s pioneering work on the strength of weak ties
drew attention to the significance of networks for employment. Indeed, networks represent
crucial conduits spreading the awareness of new vacancies. Moreover, they further increase the
probability of getting a job by reducing the imperfect information of employers about employee
characteristics. In particular, a well-established literature argues that they reduce selection
concerns and improve the quality of matching on unobservable characteristics (see Montgomery
[1991], Saloner [1985] and Simon and Warner [1992]). Berardi [2010] shows that they also reduce
moral hazard, since a social network may monitor and exert pressure on a worker that was hired
through it. Indeed, empirical evidence shows that the use of social networks as hiring channel is
widespread. Granovetter [1973], Rees [1966] and Corcoran [1980] found that about half of the
jobs in the United States were filled through personal contacts and Ioannides and Loury [2004]
have shown that the role played by networks has increased over time.
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Beyond employment, people access career opportunities, like job promotions, through friends,
colleagues, and other contacts. In the words of Burt [1992]: “Criteria other than financial and
human capital are used to narrow the pool down to the individual who gets the opportunity.
Those other criteria are social capital. New life is given to the proverb of success being deter-
mined less by what you know than by who you know”. This sense of the term ‘social capital’ is
entirely consistent with the coinage of the term by Coleman [1988].2
Networks not only affect the probability of getting a job or a promotion, but they are also
likely to have an impact on wages in a given job. However, there is no consensus as to the sign
of the effect. Montgomery [1991], Simon and Warner [1992], Kugler [2003], and Ioannides and
Soetevent [2006] among others find higher wage rates on average, while for instance Pistaferri
[1999] and Bentolila et al. [2010] find lower wages, when the position is filled through social
networks. Berardi [2010] develops a theoretical model rationalizing positive or negative wage
differentials, depending on the circumstances in terms of network tightness, cultural context,
non-monetary gains, bargaining power and occupation.
The characteristics of individual networks are crucial in determining the effects on labor
outcomes. Network size is the primary measure. Munshi [2003] shows that social interactions
improve labor market outcomes among migrants and, in particular, that a larger network at
the destination substantially increases the probability that the individual will be employed.
Similarly, Beaman [2011], Conley and Topa [2002], and Bayer et al. [2008] find that a larger
network helps in job search. Patacchini and Zenou [2008], based on the dynamic model of
Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson [2004], stress that the individual probability of finding a job is
increasing in the number of ties. Using a panel of local authority-level data in England between
1993 and 2003, they find that the higher the percentage of a given ethnic group living nearby,
the higher the employment rate of this ethnic group. Podolny and Baron [1997] find that
mobility is enhanced by having large networks for those informal ties oriented toward acquiring
information and resources. Finally, Burt [1992] argues that size is a mixed blessing. More
contacts can mean more exposure to valuable information, more likely early exposure, and
more referrals. However, increasing network size without considering its diversification can be
2Indeed he states that “An important form of social capital is the potential for information that inheres in
social relations”
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costly without bringing much benefit. Indeed, social contacts require time and energy and new
links that make a network denser fatten it without expanding it.
The relation between network size and expected wages has generally been found to be
positive on average (see Arrow and Borzekowski [2004], Montgomery [1991], and Boxman et al.
[1991]). Ioannides and Soetevent [2006] find that the wage rates of the most well connected are
15% to 25% higher than those of workers without connections.3
Other aspects of networks may matter apart from their size. Munshi [2003] also shows that
an longer-established network at the destination substantially increases the probability that
a migrant will be employed. Podolny and Baron [1997] instead stress that the effects of tie
duration on mobility vary across types of networks. In particular, they distinguish between ties
that are position-based or induced by organizational structure and those that are person-based
or discretionary. The mobility benefit of networks that are primarily position-based should be
shorter-lived than the value of person-based ties; the former will tend to obsolesce with time,
especially after an individual changes formal positions, whereas the latter, being based on trust
and familiarity, should appreciate with time.4
The strength of weak ties argument affirmed by Granovetter [1973] stresses the prominent
role of weak ties as far as labor outcomes are concerned. Recent contributions by Berardi
[2010] and Patacchini and Zenou [2008] show that the role played by tightness may vary with
circumstances. A complementary approach initiated by Burt [1992] argues that what matters
the most is not tightness, but the number of non redundant contacts.5 People bridging structural
holes6 should know about more rewarding opportunities and obtain higher rates of return.
This paper bridges between the network literature and the rather vast literature on executive
board members’ compensation and mobility. It is particularly important to draw together the
insights of these two fields, professional networks are often used in the recruitment of executives
3Lalanne and Seabright [2011] find that this relation holds only for men executives; better connected women
executives do not have salaries significantly higher than less well connected women.
4Podolny and Baron [1997] reckon that in the organizational context many ties function primarily as conduits
for some resource, particularly access and information. However, they stress that ties in a cohesive social group
are important sources of identity and social support, which may be as well crucial in a professional context, for
instance allowing to internalize clear expectations for one’s role.
5Burt [1992] argues that, while weak ties and structural holes seem to describe the same phenomenon, the
causal agent in the phenomenon is not the weakness of a tie but the structural hole it spans and the weak-tie
argument obscures the control benefits of structural holes.
6Burt [1992] defines a structural hole as a relationship of non redundancy between two contacts. Thus, non
redundant contacts are connected by a structural hole.
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and Company Directors. Indeed, such individuals constitute “a tiny group of about a dozen
individuals holding unusual power in overseeing a company’s future and corporations make
all efforts to recruit well-connected and experienced directors. (...) This interlocked network
of board members plays a crucial role in spreading corporate practices and maintaining the
political and economic clout of big corporations” (Baraba´si [2002]).
At the same time, “the managerial labor market offers a unique and data-rich environment to
analyze promotions, separations, and careers. Even when results for executives cannot be easily
extrapolated to other labor groups, the results are important in their own right: top managers
are critical and highly visible inputs into the corporate production function, and understanding
better their role can enrich our understanding of both incentives and organizations” (Murphy
[1999]).
Finally, executive compensation has attracted much attention since the 90s, particularly due
to growing disparities between CEO pay and average worker pay.7 Engelberg et al. [2011] and
Brown et al. [2009] show CEOs’ networks have a sizeable effect on their compensation. This
paper focuses instead on the role of the professional network on executives’ salary and mobility.
3 Dataset and stylized facts
The analysis is based on an original dataset describing the career history of more than 90000
executives and board members of US, UK, French and German companies between 1997 and
2009. The dataset was provided to us by BoardEx Ltd, a UK supplier of data to headhunting
companies. BoardEx’s own proprietary database (which we refer to hereafter as the ‘main’
database) consists of information about some 380000 individuals who are current or past board
members or executives of European and US companies. The database provided to us, however,
consists of the subset of their main database8 for which salary data are available at least for
some years between 1997 and 2009. There are almost 5000 firms in our dataset, and for each firm
we have information about all board members; for firms with fewer than five board members
7The rapid growth in executives’ pay started in the mid-1970s and has been observed to decline only after
2000 (Frydman and Jenter [2010]).
8BoardEx cut-off criterion is a market capitalization above 1 million USD and they collect information in
many countries. For UK and US BoardEx has a complete coverage on companies listed on major indices. Our
dataset is composed of individuals working for firms randomly drawn from BoardEx coverage. We end up with
2100 firms based in the US, 1613 in the UK, and the full BoardEx coverage of France (220) and Germany (80).
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we have information on the five most highly salaried executives where salary information exists.
The dataset contains information about individuals’ demographic characteristics such as age and
gender, about individuals’ employment history such as earnings and position, about individuals’
education characteristics such as degree achieved and major, and about firms’ characteristics
such as sector or number of employees.
Our analysis discards individuals that hold a board position with no executive responsibilities
(about half of the overall original dataset).9 This choice is motivated by the fact that non-
executives have very different compensation schemes from executives, often composed of a null
or symbolic salary component, and usually hold a position in many boards at the same time.10
Moreover, since the transition between executive and non-executive positions11 entails specific
salary dynamics, we focus on workers that keep executive positions over time.12 We also exclude
individuals with null salary, since this is highly unlikely to result from a proper executive
occupation. Finally, since the main focus of this paper is on job mobility and very few executives
change job each year, our econometric analysis relies on a cumulation of job changes over 4 year
(about 4.5% of executives changed firm or were fired between 2002 and 2006) and on a cross-
section enriched with lagged values referring to 4 years before. Finally, we put aside the first
years of data due to relatively low coverage, and the last three years due to the crisis period.
The benchmark analysis of this paper is based on data referring to the years 2006 and lagged
values of 2002.13 Table 1 and 2 show some descriptive statistics at the individual and firm level
respectively for the year 2006.
The unique feature of our dataset is the information provided on networks. In general, each
individual is simultaneously embedded in very different types of social networks. In the present
context we are especially interested in the professional network, that is, the links resulting from
one’s professional activity. There are many ways of assessing networks. Often people are asked
9Lalanne and Seabright [2011] document that executives and non-executives behave in very different ways.
10The most frequent categories of executive jobs are CEOs. The main functions held are general management,
followed by finance. Notice that executives may also hold a seat on a board. Our analysis focuses however on
their main executive position.
11Vancil (1987) estimates that 80% of exiting (non-deceased) CEOs remain on their firms’ boards of directors;
and 36% continue serving on the board as chairman.
12Among workers holding an executive position in 2006 and also present in the dataset in 2002, less than 4%
were not holding an executive position in 2002. This may imply a small bias in our selected sample.
13The time period 2002-2006 has the highest number of observations and is obviously not affected by the crisis.
The main results are robust to the choice of different time periods and are available upon request.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics at the individual level for executives in 2006.
Variable Mean (SD) Min. Max. N
Number of links 145.747 (193.507) 4 1669 6895
Mean link duration (years) 5.046 (2.137) 1.629 16.667 6895
Mean link age (years) 5.866 (4.734) 0 38.465 6895
Colleagues in network 18.66 (7.783) 1 58 6921
Salary (thousand USD) 389.97 (285) 0.854 6918.75 6921
Liquid wealth (thousand USD) 31483.377 (646945) 0 42684792 6665
Total wealth (thousand USD) 38775.991 (657062) 0 42684792 5362
Changed firm or fired since 2005 (prop) 0.018 (0.131) 0 1 5456
Changed firm or fired since 2002 (prop) 0.046 (0.209) 0 1 5456
Gender: female (prop) 0.052 (0.223) 0 1 6921
Age 53.5 (7.6) 28 97 6896
Achieved degree: BA (prop) 0.216 (0.411) 0 1 6921
Achieved degree: MA (prop) 0.279 (0.449) 0 1 6921
Achieved degree: PhD (prop) 0.163 (0.369) 0 1 6921
Degree major: Business (prop) 0.237 (0.425) 0 1 6921
Degree major: Finance (prop) 0.069 (0.253) 0 1 6921
Degree major: Science (prop) 0.015 (0.122) 0 1 6921
Degree major: Social Science (prop) 0.077 (0.266) 0 1 6921
Table 2: Descriptive statistics at the firm level for 2006.
Variable Mean (SD) Min. Max. N
Firm number of employees 13332 (48035) 1 1800000 3204
Firm country: US (prop) 0.553 (0.497) 0 1 3294
Firm country: UK (prop) 0.386 (0.487) 0 1 3294
Firm country: France (prop) 0.041 (0.199) 0 1 3294
Firm country: Germany (prop) 0.020 (0.14) 0 1 3294
Sector: construction (prop) 0.033 (0.179) 0 1 3294
Sector: defense (prop) 0.009 (0.095) 0 1 3294
Sector: education (prop) 0.002 (0.043) 0 1 3294
Sector: financial (prop) 0.128 (0.334) 0 1 3294
Sector: health (prop) 0.031 (0.172) 0 1 3294
Sector: information (prop) 0.152 (0.359) 0 1 3294
Sector: mining (prop) 0.072 (0.258) 0 1 3294
Sector: real estate (prop) 0.042 (0.2) 0 1 3294
Sector: services (prop) 0.092 (0.289) 0 1 3294
Sector: technical (prop) 0.047 (0.211) 0 1 3294
Sector: trade (prop) 0.062 (0.241) 0 1 3294
Sector: transportation (prop) 0.031 (0.173) 0 1 3294
Sector: utilities (prop) 0.032 (0.176) 0 1 3294
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to list their links. This procedure suffers however from concerns related to self-reporting and
directionality of the reported ties. Moreover, it is very costly and therefore usually identifies
rather small and intimate networks. Here instead, links are factual14, not revealed. In our
dataset a link is created when two persons work together.15 The average number of professional
links is 146, while the median is 72 in 2006.16 In what follows we use the variable name ‘Links’
to refer to the number of members of the BoardEx main database with whom an individual
in our dataset has worked in the same firm at the same time. This is the main explanatory
variable we shall use in the analysis that follows. Notice that the links are not necessarily to
other individuals in our dataset, which would arbitrarily restrict our measure of the size of
individuals’ networks by whether or not we have salary information about the members of that
network.
Also note that, even if one of the two nodes leaves the workplace, the link is not considered
extinct. However, the link with a past colleague may play a different role than an ongoing
relationship with a colleague. Therefore, we compute the number of years elapsed since two
workers have been colleagues. The mean link ‘age’ is almost 6 years, while the median is 4 and a
half. We also compute the number of contemporaneous colleagues present in the dataset, which
is on average about 19. Finally, we calculate the ‘duration’ of a link as the years of overlapping
of two persons in the same workplace. The mean overlap is about 5 years.
Most executive pay packages contain four components: a base salary, an annual bonus tied
to accounting performance, stock options, and long-term incentive plans. In our dataset salary
is base annual pay. Liquid wealth is the sum of the value of shares held17 and the intrinsic
14Links are defined on the basis of relational states and events. That is, social ties are proxied by group co-
membership, which is likely to contribute to the formation of ties. While in general it is difficult to infer whether
people know each other at work, in the case of top executives it seems unlikely that two of them working in the
same firm do not know each other one way or another. However, we lack information about the effort invested
in each potential link.
15While many studies focus on friends, the focus of this paper is on professional links. Indeed, Podolny and
Baron [1997] find that friendship is not the relevant network for studying career mobility. Notice that the
network of all contact acquired while working would be larger than the professional network of current and
previous colleagues defined in this paper.
16Extrapolating from the brain sizes and social networks of apes, Dr.Dunbar suggested that the size of the
human brain allows stable networks of about 150, which is known as the Dunbar number. Other anthropologists
have come up with estimates of almost double the Dunbar number for the upper limit of human groups. Sociol-
ogists distinguish between a person’s wider network of people known by name, estimate between 200 and 5000,
and his social core.
17That is, multiplies the number of shares held directly by the individual by the stock price of the organization.
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value of exercisable options18. Finally, total wealth is the sum of equity, estimated value of
options, and long term incentive programs held (in thousand of US Dollars). This paper focuses
on salary. Indeed, executives devote substantial attention to the salary-determination process.
Although salaries comprise a declining percentage of total compensation,19 they are key in the
contract and risk free. Moreover, most components of compensation are measured relative to
base salary levels.20 Wealth on the other hand is more likely to be reported with measurement
error, since it is often difficult to assess it precisely. In a robustness analysis we look at wealth;
network effects are qualitatively similar, but stronger21, consistently with the results reported
in Engelberg et al. [2011] and in Lalanne and Seabright [2011].
The probability of changing organization between 2005 and 2006 is less than 2% on average.22
Only 5% of executives are women and the average age is 53 years. They often hold a master
degree in Business. Finally, Table 2 shows some characteristics at the firm level, such as size
and sector. The majority of firms have their headquarters in the US and the most common
sectors in the dataset are finance, information, and services.
A first exploration of the variables that are at the center of this paper (professional links,
salary, and mobility decisions)23 reveals some interesting patterns24 that are going to form the
basis of the theoretical framework of the paper. The Spearman correlation between salary and
previous professional links is significant and equal to 0.31. At the same time, the Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test25 indicates that the salary significantly differs between workers that stayed
in the same firm and those who decided to change firm in the previous four years. In partic-
18That is, by how much the total number of options held are in the money. This is the gap between the exercise
price of the options held and the stock price, multiplied by the number of options held.
19The increase over time of executive pay is mainly attributable to increase in the grant-date value of stock
option grants, but the growth in stock option use did not occur at the expense of other components of pay (see
Murphy [1999] and Frydman and Jenter [2010]).
20See Murphy [1999].
21See section 5.3.1.
22The mean time spent in an organization almost 14 years. Among executives 60% are also board members and
the average number of years spent in a board is below 2 years. Jensen and Murphy [1990] find in a thirteen-year
sample that CEOs hold their jobs an average of over ten years before leaving, and most leave their position only
after reaching normal retirement age. 60% of the sample CEOs are between 60 and 66 when they leave their
firm; 32% are ages 64 or 65.
23As already explained, we look at variables in 2006 and use 2002 as previous period when considering lagged
values.
24These relations and their significance are robust to a first set of ceteris paribus analyses (results available
upon request) that includes a number of controls at the individual (previous salary, age, gender, degree level and
major) and firm (country, sector, and size) level.
25The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is a non-parametric test for independent samples.
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ular, the former have lower salaries than the latter on average. Moreover, mobility decisions
significantly vary with professional links. Indeed, the size of the professional network of workers
deciding to stay is smaller than for people changing firm in the subsequent period. Finally, the
number of professional links is larger for workers that previously decided to change firm and it
is strongly related to the number of links previously held, as expected.
Therefore, the modeling exercise developed in section 4 is going to take into account the
following observations: 1) salary is significantly related to previous number of professional links
and mobility; 2) mobility is related to the size of the professional network contemporaneous to
the decision; 3) the number of links is related to both the number of previously held links and
to previous mobility decisions.
4 Theoretical framework
The key idea underlying our modeling of career dynamics is that career choices and professional
networks coevolve. We develop a dynamic framework where the utility of a worker is affected by
the choices she makes during her career and by the characteristics of her professional network.
The idea is that wages may be directly affected by professional networks if their characteristics
are valuable for the employer. Indeed, the fact that an employee has personal contacts with
workers in another firm may increase the likelihood of new contracts or facilitate the transactions
between the two firms. An alternative interpretation, even if contacts did not improve business,
is that they may affect the bargaining power of a worker.26 The individuals’ employment
network outside the firm represents in this sense a form of social capital that may be useful
for the employer and that is thus ‘remunerated’. Decisions along the career path shape the
development of one’s professional network. For instance, when a worker decides to move to
a new firm, her professional network is likely to expand, since new links will be created with
new colleagues. Thus, mobility choices affect worker’s network. At the same time it seems
reasonable to argue that professional opportunities don’t arise randomly among workers. A well-
established stylized fact is that the probability of moving to another firm is likely to be affected
by an individual’s employment network. In particular, the larger the first degree network of the
26This interpretation is explored for CEOs by Engelberg et al. [2011].
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individual, the higher the probability that she gets exposed to job offers. This is particularly
true in the case of top managers and board members. These positions are usually filled through
head hunting and professional acquaintanceship, rather than through formal advertisement of
openings.
4.1 Setting
An individual’s career is modeled as a sequence of periods from t = 0, ..., T . In t = 0 the
individual starts her career and at the end of t = T she retires. At many points in time during
an individual’s career, each worker may have a choice whether or not to change her job. While
professional dynamics may entail continuous progressions within the current firm and even
within the current job position, this paper especially focuses on discrete progressions. Indeed,
changing firm is usually the kind of professional mobility that most actively involves and affects
an individual’s professional network.27 We thus simplify the space of career choices, restricting
our attention to a worker’s decision to accept an offer from another firm, as illustrated in Figure
1. Between the beginning and the end of the career, the individual may have the opportunity to
Figure 1: Potential career choices.
change firm several times. That is, at each time 0 ≤ t < T , she may receive news of opportunities
in an alternative firm. In this case, she evaluates the best outside option and compare it with
the continuation in the current firm. In t + 1 she will either still work in current firm or will
have changed firm.
27Another crucial reason why this paper restricts attention to mobility across firms is that from an empirical
point of view it is possible to identify with more precision this type of mobility than promotions within a firm.
11
We begin by ignoring uncertainty for the moment. The individual maximizes the sum of
the discounted utility during her whole career:
V1 (l0) = max{at}T−1t=0
T−1￿
t=0
γt Ut+1 (lt, at) (1)
subject to at ∈ {S (lt) ,M (lt)} and lt+1 = ϕ (lt, at) ∀t = 0, ..., T − 1, where γ is the discount
factor, lt are the characteristics of the relevant employment network and at is the decision to
stay (S) or move (M) in t, which affects utility in t+ 1. Intuitively, a worker’s utility depends
on mobility choices and the probability of changing job may depend on a worker’s professional
network, if the information about new job opportunities spreads through it. Moreover, profes-
sional links may directly affect utility if their characteristics are valuable to the employer and
are thus remunerated as part of wage.28 Finally, the decision of staying or moving in t will in
turn affect the shape of her professional network in t+ 1.
Bellman’s Principle of Optimality suggests that the maximization can be rewritten as:





γt−1 Ut+1 (lt, at)
￿
(2)
subject to a0 ∈ {S (l0) ,M (l0)}, l1 = ϕ (l0, a0), and at ∈ {S (lt) ,M (lt)}, lt+1 = ϕ (lt, at)
∀t = 1, ..., T − 1.
The optimal value that can be obtained is therefore:
V1 (l0) = maxa0 [U1 (l0, a0) + γ V2 (l1)] (3)
subject to a0 ∈ {S (l0) ,M (l0)} and l1 = ϕ (l0, a0). In the case where time is infinite we could
drop time subscripts and write:
V (l) = maxa∈{S(l),M(l)} [U (l, a) + γ V (ϕ (l, a))] (4)
In fact an individual’s career horizon is finite so the maximization problem is solved backward
28Notice the value to the employer of an employee’s professional network that it is possible to identify does not
correspond in a non-neoclassical framework to the total value that a worker represent to her employer. Rather,
by ‘value to the employer’ we mean the value that the employer is induced to bid for an employee at equilibrium.
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starting from the last period of career.
In fact also, uncertainty matters to individual choices since not all possibilities are available
for sure. We assume that the individual can always choose to stay in the current firm with
probability one. While not strictly realistic, this allows us to ignore firing or firm bankruptcy
and focus on voluntary career moves. The decision taken in t whether or not to change job
in t + 1 arises with the probability p (lt), which is an increasing function of the number of
professional ties in t. Thus, in t the expected value is:
E Vt+1 (lt) = p (lt)maxat [Vt+1 (lt|at = S) , Vt+1 (lt|at =M)] + [1− p (lt)]Vt+1 (lt|at = S) (5)
We further assume that there always exists a potential offer that gives at least the value provided
by staying in the current firm, i.e. Vt+1 (lt|at =M) ≥ Vt+1 (lt|at = S). In this case, p (lt)
represents the probability that a job opportunity better than the current one arises and the
expected value simplifies to:
E Vt+1 (lt) = p (lt)Vt+1 (lt|at =M) + (1− p (lt))Vt+1 (lt|at = S) (6)
where Vt+1 (lt|at = S) = Ut+1 (lt|at = S) + γ E Vt+2 (lt+1|at = S) and Vt+1 (lt|at =M) =
Ut+1 (lt|at =M) + γ E Vt+2 (lt+1|at =M).
The optimal value depends on current utility and expected future value. That is, when a
worker is considering an offer to change job, she takes into account on one hand the proposed
compensation, which may be directly affected by her professional network if the employer values
it. On the other hand, she also takes into account the dynamic effect of moving, through the
changes in her network. Indeed, changing jobs is likely to increase her professional network,
which in turn will increase the probability of receiving interesting offers in the future (and, thus,
the expected future value), so that network and career actually coevolve.
4.2 The role of professional links
We turn now to a more analytical understanding of the different channels whereby professional
links affect career outcomes. From expression (6) it is easy to see that the professional network
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plays a role in several ways. Indeed, the derivative of the value in t+1 with respect to professional
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[Vt+1 (lt|at =M)− Vt+1 (lt|at = S)]￿ ￿￿ ￿
mobility effect
(8)
Expression (8) implies that the overall impact of links results from three effects. The first
term constitutes the direct effect that professional links have on value beyond mobility, that
is, the extent to which they directly affect the career value. It captures the value that a
worker’s contacts represent to the employer. The second is a composite term capturing the role
that professional networks play through mobility (i.e. second and third effect): the gain from
changing job with respect to staying in the current firm multiplied by the extent to which links
affect the probability of getting the information about a better job opportunity.
4.3 From the theoretical framework to the empirical specification
In order to assess the relative role played by the different effects that are identified in the
theoretical framework, it is necessary to disentangle the three channels. Indeed, if we simply
estimated Yt+1 = β0+β1lt+β2Xt+1+￿t+1, where Yt+1 is the career value (for the moment, it can
be useful to think of it as simply the salary) and Xt+1 the standard determinants, the estimated
coefficient ￿β1 would combine the three channels whereby links affect a worker’s value. Nor it is
29If this hypothesis was not true, the same network would have a different effect depending on whether a
worker changes firm or not. That is, the link direct effect would be different for stayers and movers. In this case,
empirically we would need to allow for potentially different effects on links on the salary for movers and stayers.
We should then estimate an endogenous switching model. However, since there are few observations for movers,
convergence is not achieved. Therefore, to the extent that it is reasonable to assume that links have the same
effect on salary for movers and for stayers, it is possible to interpret the difference in the impact of links on value
for movers and stayers as a measure of the probability of moving.
14
sufficient to include explicitly the mobility decisions (i.e., Yt+1 = β0+β1lt+β2Xt+1+β3At+￿t+1,
where At is the decision taken in period t, or Yt+1 = β0+β1lt+β2Xt+1+β3At+β4lt ∗At+￿t+1),
since At may be endogenous with respect to Yt+1. Indeed, beyond professional networks, some
unobserved individual or firm characteristics may affect both mobility and salary.
Instead, based on the theoretical framework the benchmark empirical specification in this
paper takes into account that utility depends directly on links and on mobility decisions. More-
over, it considers that the professional network affects the probability of career mobility and
therefore indirectly utility. That is, the benchmark empirical specification consists of two stages.
The first stage estimates the probability of being offered a better job opportunity:
At = δ0 + δ1￿￿￿￿
link indirect effect
lt + δ2Zt + ζt (9)
where Zt includes the controls Xt+1 and at least a mobility determinant that is legitimately
excluded from the second stage. The second stage is then represented by:
Yt+1 = β0 + β1￿￿￿￿
link direct effect
lt + β2Xt+1 + β3￿￿￿￿
mobility effect
￿At + ￿t+1 (10)
The three components singled out in the theoretical framework (see expression (8) in section
4.2) correspond to the estimated coefficient ￿β1 (link direct effect), ￿β3 (mobility effect), and ￿δ1
(link indirect effect).
In principle, the potential endogeneity of professional links with respect to salary is of
course a concern. However, the reciprocal causal relationship between mobility and network
size is explicitly accounted for in our model: links in period t may affect the mobility decision
taken in that period and effective in t+1. Reverse causality is not an issue because the impact
of changing firm on network size will be realized in t+1. As for the possibility that unobserved
individual characteristics affect both network size and salaries, we take this partially into account
by the inclusion of lagged salaries. Lalanne and Seabright [2011] explore the issue of unobserved
heterogeneity in detail using a dynamic panel analysis and find that the magnitude of the effect
of network size on salaries is slightly higher when estimated in this way than when unobserved
heterogeneity is ignored or treated via a lagged dependent variable; this suggests that any bias
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in our own results is likely to be small and in the direction of strengthening our results.30
Notice that in general Yt+1 is not simply represented by the salary, but by the continuation
value. One way to approximate the continuation value empirically is to take into account
not only salary, but also equities, stock options, and long term incentive plans. However,
the precision of this global amount is not very high. Therefore, beyond checking alternative
measures of the dependent variable, we also run a further complementary test to check the
robustness of the benchmark specification. The test is based on the observation that in the last
period of a worker’s career (T ), she has no longer to decide whether changing job and links are
then not useful to find a better job in the following period (i.e. p (lT ) = 0).31 Therefore, in










[UT (lT−1|aT−1 =M)− UT (lT−1|aT−1 = S)]
(11)
Thus, we can estimate link effects directly on salary for individuals close to retirement.32
5 Econometric specification and results
In the theoretical framework developed in section 4, at many points in time during a worker’s
career she may receive offers and has to decide whether to stay in the current firm or to change
job. The decision taken at each point is dynamic and takes into account not only the utility in
that period, but also the discounted expected utility in the future. In particular, the optimal
value depends on professional networks directly through utility to the extent that links are
valuable to the employer and indirectly through the effect that they have on mobility decisions.
Based on the benchmark specification suggested by the theoretical framework, we find ev-
idence that professional networks are relevant both because valuable for the employer and
because they facilitate job mobility. Moreover, we investigate some characteristics of the rele-
30We cannot use a dynamic panel analysis for our own specification because of the infrequency with which
individuals change firms in any one year (an aspect Lalanne and Seabright [2011] do not explore).
31This seems reasonable as far as executive positions are concerned, while it may still be the case that the
professional network built in an executive career contributes to getting a better non-executive position in a board.
This is however beyond the dynamics analyzed by the present paper.
32The results can be generalized to the extent that the way networks affect utility does not change over time.
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vant network component (section 5.2). We find that contemporaneous colleagues are not useful
channels of information transmission about job opportunities, nor valuable for the employer.
The average length of the overlapping time of workers in the same firm and the average time
elapsed since then have a negative impact on the network value to the employer. Moreover we
find that professional networks characterized by longer average time spent in the same firm as
colleagues are less useful to find a better job. To the extent that overlapping time may proxy
ties strength, this result supports Granovetter’s theory of the ‘strength of weak ties’. Finally,
we check the robustness of the main findings with respect to alternative definitions of career
value and to specifications accounting for mobility and link endogeneity (section 5.3.2). Table
10 summarizes the estimated elasticities of salary with respect to professional links.
5.1 Benchmark
The benchmark econometric specification suggested by the theoretical framework developed
in section 4 comprises a first stage where the dependent variable is the mobility decision (see
expression (9)) and a second stage where the dependent variable is the career value (see expres-
sion (10) in section 4.3). Since mobility decisions are endogenous to salary it is necessary that
at least one variable included in Zt in expression (9) is legitimately excluded from the Xt+1
variables in expression (10).
In transposing the theoretical framework to empirical estimation we face the practical diffi-
culty that the percentage of workers changing firm between each period t and t+1 is extremely
low if we consider a one-year interval. Therefore, four years are cumulated. The dependent vari-
able of the first stage (from table 4 on) is a dummy variable taking unit value if a worker has
changed firm between 2002 (excluded) and 2006 (included). To be consistent with our theoreti-
cal framework, where dismissal is ruled out and mobility decisions result from the maximization
of the expected value over the career, the econometric analysis does not consider individuals
that changed firm and get a lower salary (about 30% of the observed mobility of executives) as
workers that voluntarily decided to work for another firm.33
33Between 2002 and 2006 the percentage of executives changing firm without salary penalties is about 3%. This
resctriction aims at consistency between the theoretical and empirical analyses. Indeed, to be able to interpret
the results on the basis of our framework, this sample selection is necessary. It is possible that workers may
choose a job for unobservable reasons, but we cannot distinguish empirically between this voluntary choice and
fired workers. While this could create a bias, the main results do not change. If we considered the sample of
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Before proceeding to the estimation of our benchmark, we rapidly illustrate the simple OLS
estimates for comparison purposes. The first column of table 3 shows the simplest possible
OLS estimation. The estimated elasticity of salary with respect to professional links captures
the overall impact of network size on salary. The estimated network effect implies that a 1%
change in network size accompanies a 0.163% increase in salary on average. For instance, 50%
more links (from the average of 121 to 182) would imply an average annual salary increase
of 32 thousand USD (from the average 390 to 422 thousand USD). However, there may be
some unobserved factors that affect both the number of professional links and salary. We
therefore include as a control past salary (column [II]) in order to control as much as possible
for unobserved heterogeneity. Taking into account mean reversion reduces the elasticity with
respect to links by two thirds. Including past salary may actually lead to some underestimation
of the effect of professional networks on salary by absorbing even too much variance related to
individual heterogeneity. Alternative specifications are run in section 5.3.3 and confirm that the
network effect as estimated by our benchmark specification is likely to be quite conservative.
The theoretical framework points out that professional links may also affect salary through
their impact on mobility. The third and fourth column of table 3 take into account the role
played by mobility by including a dummy variable that takes unit value when a worker has
changed job in the previous 4 years.34 Column [IV] also controls for unobserved heterogeneity
through past salary. However, as explained in section 4.3, it is not sufficient to include mo-
bility as it may be endogenous. Therefore, we now turn to the estimation of our benchmark
specification.
The benchmark specification results from our theoretical framework. The latter identified
three effects of professional networks on the career value (see section 4.2): a link direct effect
(beyond mobility), a mobility effect (the gain from changing firm), and a link indirect effect
(through the probability of changing firm). The link direct and indirect effects correspond to
the estimated coefficients of links respectively in the second and first stage (β1 in expression
all the workers that changed firm independently of the subsequent salary, the only differences are that previous
salary loses its significance in the first-stage and that a borderline significant negative mobility effect emerges in
the second stage.
34Notice that once introduced this variable, the dummy variables for firm location in France and Germany are
dropped due to collinearity. Indeed, there are no workers in firms located in France and Germany who changed
firm between 2002 and 2006. This is not surprising, since firms in France and Germany represent respectively
only 4% and 2% of sampled firms.
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Table 3: Network effects on salary (OLS estimation).
Ln salary (2006) [I] [II] [III] [IV]
Ln links (2002) 0.163*** 0.053*** 0.158*** 0.048***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age (2006) 0.130*** 0.010 0.148*** 0.016
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Age sq. (2006) -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender: female -0.200*** -0.042 -0.227*** -0.053*
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
Achieved degree: BA 0.178*** 0.063*** 0.167*** 0.056***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Achieved degree: MA 0.183*** 0.081*** 0.177*** 0.079***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Achieved degree: PhD 0.148*** 0.030 0.147*** 0.015
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Degree major: Business 0.065** 0.018 0.085*** 0.016
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Degree major: Finance -0.026 0.025 -0.004 0.032
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Degree major: Science -0.210*** -0.097** -0.090 -0.021
(0.08) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06)
Degree major: Social Sciences -0.043 0.054 -0.063 0.055
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Firm country (2006): UK 0.169*** 0.249*** 0.201*** 0.258***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Firm country (2006): Germany -0.135 -0.214
(0.09) (0.27)
Firm country (2006): France -0.474*** -0.001
(0.12) (0.13)
Ln salary (2002) 0.723*** 0.724***
(0.02) (0.02)
Changed firm (2002-06) 0.109* 0.283***
(0.06) (0.07)
Intercept 1.382*** 1.280*** 1.106** 1.185***
(0.51) (0.28) (0.52) (0.29)
N 6825 6768 5431 5431
R2 0.111 0.617 0.114 0.632
Note: Robust Standard Errors in brackets, clustered by firm.
Significance levels: *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%.
(10) and δ1 in expression (9) in section 4.3). The mobility effect is represented by the estimated
coefficient of the dummy variable for having changed firm (β3 in expression (10) in section 4.3).
In order to be able to estimate the two-stage model, we need to single out factors that
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affect voluntary choices of changing job, but are not salary determinants otherwise. A natural
candidate are external conditions that may affect mobility choices. For instance, to the extent
that executives are able to work for firms in different sectors, they could be more inclined to
change job when their sector suffers from an economic slowdown. We thus exploit the evolution
of sectoral stock index, namely the MSCI sectoral weighted market capitalization index35, to
take into account the fact that a worker’s choice to change job can result from poor performance
of the industry she is working in. The growth rate of sectoral weighted market capitalization
index between 2006 and 2002 corresponding to the firm where the worker was in 200236 captures
the evolution of the market capitalization index for the ‘incumbent’ sector. It is expected to
have a negative impact on the probability of moving. For this sectoral performance variable to
be a valid instrument, it is also necessary that it does not affect salary beyond its impact through
mobility decisions. The determinants of salary are many and complex and it would seem possible
that sectoral performance might correlate with compensation. However, performance tends to
influence other components that are more variable than salary, and many studies looking for
performance effects in executive compensation have not found any relation.37
We also impose an additional exclusion restriction relying on a different source of external
variation. The fact that a firm changed the country of its headquarters is likely to affect mobility
choices of its workers, while not directly the salary component of their overall compensation.38
To the extent that the exclusion restrictions hold, the estimated coefficients of the benchmark
specification reported in table 4 allow us to assess the multiple effect that professional networks
have on workers’ career.
The main object of interest in the first stage estimation is the relation between network size
and mobility. Indeed, the estimated network coefficient relates to the indirect effect of links on
salary through the probability of changing firm. The theoretical framework described in section
4 assumes that mobility decisions depend on a workers’ professional network. In particular, we
35We exploit the MSCI sectoral weighted market capitalization index relative to the US and Europe (for firms
in UK, Germany, and France). The index is a market capitalization weighted index that is designed to measure
the equity market performance of the developed markets.
36This firm variable has a mean of 0.62 and a standard deviation of 0.22. The minimum value is -0.06 and the
maximum 1.24.
37Jensen and Murphy [1990] for instance find that for CEOs that their compensation is unrelated to market
and industry performance. Friebel and Matros [2005] provide a theoretical framework explaining how CEOs in
bad firms may nonetheless receive larger wages.
38This is a rare event, taking place for only 1.2% of firms.
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Table 4: Network effects on salary (2SLS estimation: benchmark).
[I stage] [II stage]
Changed firm (2002-06) Ln salary (2006)
Ln links (2002) 0.018*** (0.00) 0.067*** (0.01)
Ln salary (2002) -0.013*** (0.00) 0.712*** (0.02)
Age (2006) -0.000 (0.00) 0.016 (0.01)
Age sq. (2006) -0.000 (0.00) -0.000* (0.00)
Gender: female -0.012 (0.01) -0.062** (0.03)
Achieved degree: BA 0.015*** (0.01) 0.073*** (0.02)
Achieved degree: MA 0.017** (0.01) 0.097*** (0.02)
Achieved degree: PhD 0.012 (0.01) 0.031 (0.03)
Degree major: Business 0.018** (0.01) 0.034 (0.02)
Degree major: Finance 0.011 (0.01) 0.042 (0.03)
Degree major: Science -0.011 (0.01) -0.033 (0.06)
Degree major: Social Sciences 0.006 (0.01) 0.059 (0.04)
Firm country (2006): UK 0.030*** (0.01) 0.288*** (0.02)
Sectoral growth for 2002-firm (2006-02) -0.027** (0.01)
Headquarters country changed (2006-02) 0.562*** (0.13)
Changed firm (2002-06) -0.754 (0.49)
Intercept 0.056 (0.07) 1.215*** (0.32)
N 5431 5431
Pseudo R2 / R2 0.056 0.581
F statistic cluster-robust 11.90
Hansen J statistic 2.145
Hansen J χ2 p-value 0.143
Note: Robust Standard Errors in brackets, clustered by firm.
Significance levels: *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%.
expect that the probability of receiving an interesting job offer is increasing in the number of
direct links of an individual. As expected, in the first stage the number of professional links
held before the mobility decision takes place significantly increases the probability of changing
firm. The estimated marginal effect is 0.011, suggesting that if the network increases by 50%
(from the average 121 links to 182), the probability of choosing to change firm increases by 15%
(from the average 3% to 3.45%).
The estimated coefficients reported in the first column of table 4 also suggest that the
higher the previous salary, the lower the probability of changing job.39 This is consistent with
the observation that the utility of staying in the current firm is likely to be a smoother evolution
of the utility of previous period, while moving is more likely to be accompanied by utility jumps.
39Abowd et al. [2006] consistently find that firms that pay high wages have low turnover rate.
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The second stage regression shows that the size of the professional network significantly
affects salaries directly, even beyond its impact on mobility. The estimated coefficient of links
suggests that a 50% increase in network size accompanies a 3.25% increase of salary with respect
to the average. In other words, if a worker has 50% more links than the average (from 121 to
182 links), her annual salary would increase by 13 thousand USD (from an average of 390 to
403 thousand USD).
The second stage estimates also show that once the endogeneity of mobility is taken into
account, we cannot reject the hypothesis that changing firm has no impact on salary, so that
mobility per se does not significantly affect salary. In other terms, out of the three potential
effects identified by the theoretical model (section 4.2) the indirect and direct effects of links
are positive and significant, while the mobility effect is not significantly different from zero once
considering endogeneity.
Mincerian determinants are, as expected, significant40 and women suffer a wage penalty on
average41. Workers that earned a degree42 with a major in Business have on average higher
salary and a higher probability of changing job than those with another major. The location of
the firm is also important.43
The robustness of the results obtained with the benchmark specification is assessed with
respect to a number of dimensions. In particular, section 5.3.1 runs the same specification,
but where the dependent variable of the second stage is the sum of salary and total wealth, as
defined in section 3. Moreover, we check the extent to which the role of links changes when the
continuation value simplifies to the salary, as it is the case toward the end of the career. Finally,
section 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 assess robustness with respect to alternative specifications accounting
for the effect of mobility and network size respectively on salary.
40Murphy [1999] notices that Mincerian determinants may be less significant for top executive remuneration
than for other jobs. Indeed executive remuneration is often based on surveys that do not contain criteria like
age, experience, education. Llense (2008) for instance finds that CEO compensation is not sensitive to attributes
such as age or formal qualification.
41See Lalanne and Seabright [2011] for more details on the gender dimension.
42The reference degree achieved is a residual category.
43Firms based in the US pay lower salaries. This result may be reconciled with the literature on executive
compensation, since Murphy [1999] says that in US CEOs, and not executives in general, are paid more than
elsewhere. Moreover, executives working in the US have a larger fraction of their compensation in stock options.
Notice also that the dummies indicating firms located in Germany and France are dropped due to collinearity.
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5.2 Characteristics of relevant network components
This section explores the relevant network components as far as direct and indirect salary
effects of links are concerned. In particular, with respect to the rest of a worker’s professional
network, are colleagues in the contemporaneous firm useful? Moreover, it investigates how
the characteristics of links (and in particular duration and age) affect both network direct and
indirect relations with salary. That is, are long-lasting or old links more or less useful than
short and recent ties?
We consider the role played by contemporaneous colleagues and find evidence confirming
the intuition that it is people you know outside your current firm that are more likely to be
useful and valuable.44 Indeed, colleagues are not very likely to know much more than the
worker herself about other job possibilities, so that, as far as information diffusion is concerned,
the relevant employment network does not include worker’s colleagues contemporaneous to her
mobility decision. Moreover, as far as the direct effect of links on salary is concerned, the
most valuable links to the employer are those beyond current and former workers of the firm.45
Indeed, the latter ones represent quite useless ties for the employer in t + 1, since they are
redundant contacts among workers in the firm.
An interesting issue is how the characteristics of a worker’s network influence its direct and
indirect effects on the career. The first question is whether the time spent as colleagues plays a
role on the usefulness of the tie. In order to answer this question we include in the benchmark
specification the average overlap of links in each worker’s professional network. This variable
captures the average duration of the potentially active link. Indeed, it is very likely that two
persons have opportunities of contact when they work as top executives in the same firm, while
we cannot be sure whether nodes keep in touch when they do not work together anymore.
44Results available upon request.
45Notice that the wage effect of the component of the employment network that is useful because it spreads
information and the one that is valuable to the employer tend to empirically coincide for people with low mobility.
The reason is that empirically we proxy current and former workers of the firm with the current ones. However,
in theory the two components are different. Indeed, former colleagues that left the firm where the individual still
works are potentially very useful for spreading original information, while they are not valuable for the employer,
since those are redundant links being shared by many employees. From an empirical point of view, it is not easy to
assess the number of former colleagues that moved. For instance the number of colleagues may have not changed
between t and t+ 1, but just because newcomers compensate workers that left. In a more sophisticated analysis
where each node in the network is characterized by its full employment history this distinction is empirically
relevant.
23
The average overlap period of network links represents the closest proxy that is available to tie
strength in our dataset. The first two columns of table 5 show that networks characterized by
longer overlaps are less useful. First, they are not the best channel for spreading information
about better opportunities. This result is in line with Granovetter’s classical ‘strength of weak
ties’ argument. Second, they have a lower direct effect on salary. In a sense, it is really the size
of the network that matters.
Another interesting question is whether the recentness of links impacts their direct and
indirect effect on salary. Indeed, it is not straightforward whether more recent links should be
more or less useful to get information about job opportunities or more or less valuable for an
employer. In order to answer this question we run a variation of the benchmark specification
where we include a variable accounting for the average age of workers’ links. The estimated
coefficient of the network average age in the first stage estimation (third column of table 5)
suggests that the time elapsed since nodes were colleagues does not significantly affect their
value as information channels. A different conclusion is suggested by the second stage estimation
(last column of table 5). Indeed, networks characterized by older links are less valuable as far
as their direct effect on salary is concerned.
It would be very interesting to assess the role played by a more precise measure of link
tightness. The information available unfortunately does not indicate the intensity of relation-
ships. However, notice that the strength of a link is somehow a subjective matter and two
persons in a relationship may have a different view on the intensity of their relationship, while
we exploit objective characteristics of links. Our measures of link overlap and age avoid the
inconsistencies that arise in studies based on subjective reporting on tightness depending on
whether the network is considered undirected (i.e. links are bilateral) or directed (i.e. at least
a pair of connected nodes is asymmetric in the sense that one directed link is not symmetrically
reciprocated).
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Table 5: The role of link overlap and age (2SLS estimation).
Link Overlap Link Age
[I stage] [II stage] [I stage] [II stage]
Changed firm Ln salary Changed firm Ln salary
Ln links (2002) 0.017*** 0.062*** 0.018*** 0.093***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Mean overlap of network links (2002) -0.003*** -0.011***
(0.00) (0.00)
Mean age of network links (2002) -0.000 -0.011***
(0.00) (0.00)
Ln salary (2002) -0.012*** 0.714*** -0.013*** 0.711***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
Age (2006) -0.000 0.016 -0.000 0.017
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Age sq. (2006) -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender: female -0.011 -0.060** -0.012 -0.065**
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Achieved degree: BA 0.014** 0.072*** 0.015*** 0.075***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Achieved degree: MA 0.015** 0.094*** 0.017** 0.097***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Achieved degree: PhD 0.011 0.029 0.012 0.037
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Degree major: Business 0.018** 0.034 0.018** 0.033
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Degree major: Finance 0.010 0.039 0.011 0.057*
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Degree major: Science -0.012 -0.037 -0.011 -0.037
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
Degree major: Social Sciences 0.006 0.057 0.006 0.044
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
Firm country (2006): UK 0.027*** 0.276*** 0.031*** 0.306***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
Sectoral growth for 2002-firm (2006-02) -0.026** -0.027**
(0.01) (0.01)
Headquarters country changed (2006-02) 0.560*** 0.562***
(0.13) (0.13)
Changed firm (2002-06) -0.775 -0.786
(0.50) (0.50)
Intercept 0.068 1.264*** 0.053 1.103***
(0.07) (0.32) (0.07) (0.32)
N 5431 5431 5431 5431
F statistic cluster-robust 11.66 11.92
Pseudo R2 / R2 0.058 0.580 0.056 0.580
Hansen J statistic 1.861 1.740
Hansen J χ2 p-value 0.172 0.187
Note: Robust Standard Errors in brackets, clustered by firm. Significance levels: *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%.
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5.3 Robustness checks
5.3.1 Alternative specifications for continuation value
While executives in practice devote substantial attention to salary (see section 3), the crucial
variable of interest in the dynamic maximization sketched in the theoretical framework is the
expected value over the career. The richness of the information available allows us to test the
robustness of our results with respect to a different measure of value.
The first two columns of table 6 report the first and second stage estimates of a variation
of the benchmark specification where the dependent variable salary is replaced by the sum of
salary and total wealth.46 The idea is that the sum of salary, shares, stock options, and long
term incentive programs held approximates better than salary alone the expected value over
the career.
The indirect effect of network size on career value through mobility is of course identical
to the indirect effect on salary. However, the second stage estimated elasticity of career value
with respect to links is more than three times the one of salary. Therefore, the direct effect of
professional links on salary is a very conservative estimate of the value attributed by employers
to social capital, especially in the case of the top management of firms, that are the most likely
to earn conspicuous total wealth.47
A further test of the robustness of our results consists in verifying the extent to which the
role of links changes when the continuation value simplifies to the salary, as is the case toward
the end of the career. For people over 60 years old the future expected value has a limited role in
the optimal value, since the time horizon is short. Therefore, looking at the interaction between
the role of links and the fact of being toward the end of the career allows us to disentangle the
direct and indirect effect of employment networks on utility (see expression 11 in the theoretical
section).
The estimated coefficient of the interaction between network size and the fact of being over
60 is negative and significantly different from zero in the first stage (third column of table 6).
46To be precise we sum salary and pseudo total wealth. Indeed, in order to avoid reducing the sample size, we
substitute missing values of total wealth with its sample mean.
47Notice that this is the only specification where the mobility effect in the second stage in significantly negative.
A natural interpretation is that, when an executive changes firm, she usually looses a major part of her total
wealth. Indeed, the stock options granted by the previous firm are not exercisable any longer.
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Table 6: Robustness of network effects to alternative specifications for continuation value (2SLS
estimation).
[I stage] [II stage] [I stage] [II stage]
Changed firm Ln wealth Changed firm Ln salary
Ln links (2002) 0.018*** 0.225*** 0.018*** 0.069***
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01)
Ln salary (2002) -0.013*** 0.877*** -0.013*** 0.710***
(0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.02)
Age (2006) -0.000 -0.106*** -0.000 -0.003
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01)
Age sq. (2006) -0.000 0.001*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender: female -0.012 -0.213*** -0.012 -0.062**
(0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.03)
Achieved degree: BA 0.015*** 0.181*** 0.015*** 0.076***
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02)
Achieved degree: MA 0.017** 0.209*** 0.017** 0.096***
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02)
Achieved degree: PhD 0.012 0.004 0.012 0.030
(0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.03)
Degree major: Business 0.018** 0.091 0.018** 0.035
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02)
Degree major: Finance 0.011 -0.165** 0.011 0.043
(0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.03)
Degree major: Science -0.011 0.010 -0.011 -0.032
(0.01) (0.16) (0.01) (0.06)
Degree major: Social Sciences 0.006 0.210** 0.006 0.061
(0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.04)
Firm country (2006): UK 0.030*** -0.454*** 0.030*** 0.288***
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02)
Sectoral growth for 2002-firm (2006-02) -0.027** -0.027**
(0.01) (0.01)
Headquarters country changed (2006-02) 0.562*** 0.562***
(0.13) (0.13)
Changed firm (2002-06) -1.380* -0.756
(0.77) (0.49)
Age over 60 (2002) 0.055** 0.014
(0.02) (0.19)
Interaction age over 60 & ln links (2002) -0.014*** -0.044
(0.01) (0.04)
Intercept 0.056 5.569*** 0.056 1.666***
(0.07) (0.84) (0.08) (0.38)
N 5431 5431 5431 5431
F statistic cluster-robust 11.90 11.81
Pseudo R2 / R2 0.056 0.311 0.057 0.582
Hansen J statistic 0.355 2.279
Hansen J χ2 p-value 0.551 0.131
Note: Robust Standard Errors in brackets, clustered by firm. Significance levels: *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%.
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In other words, toward the end of one’s career the role of links as channels of diffusion of job
opportunities is fading away.
At the same time, the results of the second stage estimation reported in the last column of
table 6 show that the direct effect of links on salary is not significantly different for people over
60.
5.3.2 Alternative econometric specification for mobility endogeneity
An empirical difficulty in the analysis is the endogeneity of mobility decisions with respect to
salary. Indeed, there may exist unobservable variables that affect workers’ decision to change
job and also their wages. The problem is that if an individual decides to stay we only observe
her salary in her current firm, while if the worker decides to move we only observe the best
salary she was offered in another firm. Since we never observe the counterfactual wage, we need
to take into account potential endogenous selection. In this case the two groups of individuals,
those who stay longer in one firm and those who change firm, are not randomly selected. The
benchmark specification of this paper relies on instrumental variable estimation. An alternative
specification is running a Heckman model (see Heckman [1979]), a sample correction model
where selection is determined by a probit model. The model consists then of two equations: a
wage regression and a selection equation.
In our framework, the Heckman specification would be:
Yt+1 = β0 + β1lt + β2Xt+1 + ￿t+1 (12)
M∗t = δ0 + δ1lt + δ2Zt + ζt (13)
The last equation estimates the probability of changing firm and the regressors Zt include
all Xt+1, plus some instruments.48 The observed dichotomous realization of the latent variable
48The Heckman model is identified non-parametrically through non-linearities introduced by the selection
equation and parametrically through the exclusion restrictions imposed by the researcher.
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M∗t is whether each sampled worker changed job (Mt = 1) or not (Mt = 0):
Mt =





The main assumption in this case is that ￿i and ui have a bivariate normal distribution.The
estimated parameter ρ is the correlation between unobserved determinants of wage and of
changing job.
Table 7: Robustness of network effects on salary to alternative specification for mobility endo-
geneity (Heckman estimation).
Selection Wage
Changed firm Ln salary
Ln links (2002) 0.237∗∗∗ (0.034) 0.135∗∗∗ (0.038)
Ln salary (2002) -0.177∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.272∗∗∗ (0.097)
Age (2006) 0.070 (0.072) -0.026 (0.059)
Age sq. (2006) -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Gender: female -0.165 (0.166) 0.233∗∗ (0.091)
Achieved degree: BA 0.376∗∗∗ (0.127) 0.555∗∗∗ (0.159)
Achieved degree: MA 0.394∗∗∗ (0.127) 0.505∗∗∗ (0.111)
Achieved degree: PhD 0.320∗∗ (0.153) 0.143 (0.151)
Degree major: Business 0.302∗∗∗ (0.111) -0.039 (0.130)
Degree major: Finance 0.272∗ (0.165) 0.288∗ (0.172)
Degree major: Science -0.192 (0.390) 0.143 (0.242)
Degree major: Social Sciences 0.180 (0.180) 0.321∗ (0.194)
Firm country: UK (2006) 0.457∗∗∗ (0.097) 0.064 (0.119)
Sectoral growth for 2002-firm (2006-02) -0.389∗ (0.200)
Headquarters country changed (2006-02) 2.155∗∗∗ (0.363)




Note: Robust Standard Errors in brackets, clustered by firm.
Significance levels: *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%.
We report the estimation results of a simplified Heckman model with a wage regression
and a selection equation.49 The first part of table 7 reports the estimated selection equation,
49Estimates of the three equations corresponding to the endogenous switching model are available upon request.
We also run a censored regression with varying censoring values. Indeed, if we assume that workers change job
only if the offered wage is higher than what they could expect in their current firm and otherwise stay in their
firm, then salaries of workers who changed job can be interpreted as left censored. Estimates are available upon
request. That is, their salary would have been less than or equal to the one we observe. While this approach does
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while the second part the estimated wage regression.50 The correlation between the residual
of the selection and of the wage equation is not significant, suggesting that selection is not
endogenous.51 In other words, mobility does not significantly affect salary beyond the channels
we control for, as the instrumental variable estimation indicated, too. The indirect impact of
links through mobility is highly significant and their direct effect is larger than the instrumental
variable estimates. The elasticity of salary with respect to professional links suggested by the
estimation of the Heckman model is 0.144%.
5.3.3 Alternative specifications for unobserved heterogeneity
The benchmark specification of this paper controls for unobserved heterogeneity mainly through
the inclusion of previous salary as a regressor. Another possible approach is to include more
controls, namely to control as much as possible for firm characteristics. Indeed, links may be
endogenous with respect to salary because they both depend on some firm characteristics.
The second column of table 8 shows that salary indeed depends, beyond the Mincerian
determinants, on some characteristics of the firm. Beyond location,52 firm sector affects salaries
in a few cases, once firm size is controlled for.53 As expected, we find that salary adjusts for
company size.54 The estimated elasticity of salary with respect to links is higher than when
controlling for past salary. Therefore, our benchmark specification may actually absorb even too
much of the individual heterogeneity and it represents a conservative estimate of the network
effects. The estimated marginal effect of network on the probability of changing firm reported
in the first column of table 8 is basically the same as in the benchmark specification.
Another approach to take into account the endogeneity of links, beyond controlling for
rely on the validity of instruments, the Heckman model is more general, allowing the selection between staying
in the current job and changing firm to depend not only on standard wage determinants, but also on unobserved
factors.
50Results are obtained by FIML simultaneous estimation of the two equations.
51Similarly, Abowd et al. [2006] find no clear relation between residuals of mobility and wage equation.
52See section 5.1.
53Without controlling for size, a few more sectors are significant. The relatively little importance of sector is
not too surprising, since surveys adjust for company size and only sometimes for industry (see Murphy [1999]).
54As often the case, the adjustment appears to be consistent with a simple log-linear regression of logarithm
of salary on logarithm of firm size (see Murphy [1999]). Some standard explanations for the relation between
firm size and salaries are that monitoring is more difficult in big firms (Bulow and Summers [1976]) and that
large firms better select on unobserved worker characteristics (Weiss and Landau [1984]). See Abowd et al. [1999]
for a discussion of the firm-size wage effect. Base salary for CEO is typically determined through competitive
benchmarking based primarily on general industry salary surveys. Size adjustment in the survey instruments
both formalize and reinforce the observed relation between compensation and company size.
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Table 8: Robustness of network effects to alternative specifications for unobserved heterogeneity:
firm characteristics (2SLS estimation).
[I stage] [II stage]
Changed firm Ln salary
Ln links (2002) 0.016*** (0.00) 0.095*** (0.01)
Age (2006) -0.003 (0.00) 0.113*** (0.02)
Age sq. (2006) 0.000 (0.00) -0.001*** (0.00)
Gender: female -0.011 (0.01) -0.222*** (0.05)
Achieved degree: BA 0.014** (0.01) 0.171*** (0.03)
Achieved degree: MA 0.017** (0.01) 0.190*** (0.03)
Achieved degree: PhD 0.013 (0.01) 0.197*** (0.04)
Degree major: Business 0.018** (0.01) 0.074** (0.03)
Degree major: Finance 0.014 (0.01) 0.050 (0.04)
Degree major: Science -0.009 (0.01) -0.004 (0.09)
Degree major: Social Sciences 0.007 (0.01) -0.129** (0.06)
Firm country (2006): UK 0.033*** (0.01) 0.279*** (0.03)
Sector (2006): construction 0.014 (0.01) 0.032 (0.06)
Sector (2006): defense -0.022 (0.02) 0.081 (0.06)
Sector (2006): education -0.049*** (0.02) -0.250 (0.20)
Sector (2006): financial -0.004 (0.01) -0.034 (0.04)
Sector (2006): health 0.011 (0.02) -0.005 (0.04)
Sector (2006): information 0.001 (0.01) 0.020 (0.04)
Sector (2006): mining 0.022 (0.01) 0.137*** (0.04)
Sector (2006): real estate 0.011 (0.01) 0.240*** (0.07)
Sector (2006): services 0.007 (0.01) -0.087* (0.05)
Sector (2006): technical 0.029* (0.02) -0.069 (0.05)
Sector (2006): trade 0.032** (0.01) -0.046 (0.05)
Sector (2006): transportation -0.001 (0.01) -0.173** (0.07)
Sector (2006): utilities 0.016 (0.02) 0.035 (0.05)
Ln firm number of employees (2006) -0.001 (0.00) 0.133*** (0.01)
Sectoral growth for 2002-firm (2006-02) -0.049** (0.02)
Headquarters country changed (2006-02) 0.556*** (0.13)
Changed firm (2002-06) -0.160 (0.35)
Intercept 0.073 (0.07) 1.316*** (0.49)
N 5371 5371
F statistic cluster-robust 11.08
Pseudo R2 / R2 0.057 0.190
Hansen J statistic 14.355
Hansen J χ2 p-value 0.001
Note: Robust Standard Errors in brackets, clustered by firm.
Significance levels: *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%.
previous salary, is to directly consider network size as endogenous and instrument it (first
column of table 9). In order to take into account the potential endogeneity of links and to
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Table 9: Robustness of network effects to alternative specifications for unobserved heterogeneity:
endogeneity of mobility and network size (2SLS estimation).
[I stage] [I stage] [II stage]
Ln links Changed firm Ln salary
Ln links (2002) 0.202** (0.09)
Ln salary (2002) 0.239*** (0.02) -0.008*** (0.00) 0.680*** (0.03)
Age (2006) -0.007 (0.02) -0.000 (0.00) 0.017 (0.01)
Age sq. (2006) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) -0.000* (0.00)
Gender: female 0.160*** (0.06) -0.009 (0.01) -0.085** (0.03)
Achieved degree: BA 0.369*** (0.04) 0.021*** (0.01) 0.024 (0.04)
Achieved degree: MA 0.523*** (0.04) 0.027*** (0.01) 0.025 (0.05)
Achieved degree: PhD 0.405*** (0.05) 0.019** (0.01) -0.025 (0.05)
Degree major: Business 0.183*** (0.04) 0.021*** (0.01) 0.012 (0.03)
Degree major: Finance 0.831*** (0.06) 0.026*** (0.01) -0.071 (0.08)
Degree major: Science -0.218* (0.12) -0.015 (0.02) -0.004 (0.07)
Degree major: Social Sciences -0.056 (0.06) 0.006 (0.01) 0.064 (0.04)
Firm country (2006): UK -0.278*** (0.04) 0.025*** (0.01) 0.331*** (0.04)
Sectoral growth
for 2002-firm (2006-02) -0.194*** (0.06) -0.031*** (0.01)
Headquarters
country changed (2006-02) -0.068 (0.25) 0.564*** (0.04)
Number of jobs changed (2002) 0.892*** (0.09) -0.003 (0.02)
Changed firm (2002-06) -0.810 (0.50)
Intercept 2.921*** (0.43) 0.108 (0.07) 0.834* (0.43)
N 5431 5431 5431
F statistic cluster-robust 48.74
Pseudo R2 / R2 0.159 0.044 0.547
Hansen J statistic 0.557
Hansen J χ2 p-value 0.456
Note: Robust Standard Errors in brackets, clustered by firm. Significance levels: *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%.
estimate this first stage, an additional instrument is included, counting how many times the
person changed job before 2002. As intuitive, the more differentiated the experience in different
jobs, the larger the network size. The second column of table 9 reports the first stage estimates of
the determinants of mobility decisions and the last one the estimated coefficients of the second
stage. The elasticity of salary with respect to professional links is positive and significant,
consistently with the benchmark estimate. The magnitude of the elasticity is however more
than three times larger, suggesting that an increase in the number of professional links by 40
(from the average 121 to 161 links) accompanies an increase of salary of 39 thousand USD (from
the average 390 thousand to 429 thousand USD). Our benchmark estimate of link direct effect
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appears therefore as a conservative one with respect to the case where also links are considered
as endogenous (see table 10 for a comparison of estimated elasticities of salary with respect to
network size).
Table 10: Estimated elasticities of salary with respect to links (link direct effect).
elasticity estimation
0.163 basic OLS without mobility and previous salary (column [I] table 3)
0.053 basic OLS without mobility (column [II] table 3)
0.158 basic OLS without previous salary (column [III] table 3)
0.048 basic OLS (column [IV] table 3)
0.067 benchmark IV (column [I] table 4)
0.062 network charact. IV with link overlap (column [I] table 5)
0.093 network charact. IV with link age (column [III] table 5)
0.225 robustness IV continuation value (total wealth) (column [I] table 6)
0.069 robustness IV continuation value (end of career) (column [III] table 6)
0.135 robustness Heckman mobility endogeneity (column [I] table 7)
0.095 robustness IV unobs. heterogeneity (firm charact.) (column [I] table 8)
0.202 robustness IV unobs. heterogeneity (network endog.) (column [I] table 9)
6 Conclusions
This paper emphasizes that the relation between network and labor outcomes is characterized
by multiple mechanisms and dynamic coevolution. The most obvious mechanism whereby the
characteristics of professional networks affect an individual’s career is that they are privileged
channels of information diffusion. Indeed, careers are shaped by a succession of mobility deci-
sions. At many points in time during an individual’s career, a worker may receive offers and
has to decide whether staying in the current firm or changing job. The probability of moving
to another firm is likely to be affected by some characteristics of her employment network.
In particular, the larger the first degree network of the individual, the higher the probability
that she gets exposed to job offers. This is particularly true in the case of top managers and
board members. Indeed, these positions are usually filled through head hunting and professional
acquaintanceship, rather than through formal advertisement of openings.
The second way whereby professional networks influence labor outcomes is that they repre-
sent a valuable asset in the eyes of an employer.55 In particular, the individuals’ employment
55Glaeser et al. [2002] define “individual social capital as a person’s social characteristics - including social
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network outside the firm represents a form of social capital that may be useful for the employer
and that is thus remunerated.
While professional links affect labor outcomes, at the same time a worker’s network is sub-
stantially shaped by career choices. Indeed, decisions along the career path shape the develop-
ment of one’s professional network. Career choices and in particular the decision to change job
therefore result from a recursive optimization and it is necessary to look at them in a dynamic
way.
Therefore, the paper develops a dynamic framework where the utility of a worker is affected
by the choices she makes during her career and by the characteristics of her professional network.
In particular, the optimal value depends on professional networks directly through current utility
to the extent that links are valuable to the employer and indirectly through the effect that they
have on mobility decisions.
The empirical analysis finds evidence that professional networks are relevant both because
valuable for the employer and because they facilitate job mobility. For instance, based on our
benchmark 2SLS estimates, if a worker had 50% more links than the average (that is, had 61
more links more than the average 121), her annual salary would be 13 thousand USD higher
(from an average of 390 to 403 thousand USD) and the probability of moving would increase
by 15% (from an average of 3% to 3.45%). These findings are robust to alternative definitions
of career value and specifications accounting for mobility and link endogeneity.
We explore a number of network characteristics to see which matter most for the value
of links to an individual. We find, unsurprisingly, that current colleagues are not a useful
component of a worker’s network. Moreover, networks characterized on average by ties between
nodes that have been colleagues for a long time have a lower direct and indirect effect on labor
outcomes, corroborating the well known arguments of Granovetter [1973] about ‘the strength
of weak ties’. Finally, the older are the links in an individual’s network, the less valuable they
are to the employer.
Further research could shed light on the relation between other characteristics of professional
networks and labor outcomes. In particular, a further step of analysis entails the exploitation
skills, charisma, and the size of his Rolodex - which enables him to reap market and non-market returns from
interactions with others”.
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of the geometric network structure in order, for instance, to understand the relation between a
worker’s centrality and her labor outcomes.
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